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Abstract
The error-related negativity (ERN) is an event-related brain potential observed when subjects receive feedback in-
dicating errors or monetary losses. Evidence suggests that the ERN is larger for unexpected negative feedback. The
P300 has also been shown to be enhanced for unexpected feedback, but does not appear to be sensitive to feedback
valence. The present study evaluated the role of expectations on the ERN and P300 in two experiments that ma-
nipulated the probability of negative feedback (25%, 50%, or 75%) on a trial-by-trial basis in experiment 1, and by
varying the frequency of positive and negative feedback across blocks of trials in experiment 2. In both experiments,
P300 amplitude was larger for unexpected feedback; however, the ERNwas equally large for expected and unexpected
negative feedback. These results are discussed in terms of the potential role of expectations in processing errors and
negative feedback.
Descriptors: Expectations, Feedback, Event-related brain potential, Error-related negativity, Ne, P300, Reinforce-
ment learning, Response monitoring
A number of recent event-related brain potential (ERP) studies
have focused on neural activity related to errors and negative
feedback. In particular, the response-locked ERP at fronto-cen-
tral recording sites is characterized by a negative deﬂection that
begins around the time of an erroneous response and peaks ap-
proximately 50 ms later (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, &
Blanke, 1991; Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein,
2000; Gehring, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1990; Gehring, Goss,
Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). This error-related negativity
(ERN or Ne) has been observed across various stimulus and re-
sponsemodalities, and consequently appears to reﬂect the activity
of a generic response monitoring system (Bernstein, Scheffers, &
Coles, 1995; Falkenstein et al., 1991; Holroyd, Dien, & Coles,
1998; Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001).
Studies utilizing whole-head ERP recording systems and source-
localization software have consistently indicated that the ERN is
generated by a single source in the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC; Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994; Holroyd et al., 1998).
Following early response-locked ERN studies, Miltner, Bra-
un, and Coles (1997) reported an ERN-like component follow-
ing the presentation of negative feedback (cf. Ruchsow, Grothe,
Spitzer, & Kiefer, 2002; see Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, &
Coles, 2004, for a review).Miltner et al. found that when subjects
received negative feedback regarding the accuracy of their per-
formance, the ERP following negative feedback was character-
ized by a negative deﬂection at fronto-central recording sites with
a peak latency of approximately 250 ms. Like the response ERN,
this feedback ERN was source localized to near the ACC (Milt-
ner et al., 1997). In considering the topographical and morpho-
logical similarity of this feedback ERN and the response ERN,
Miltner et al. proposed that both ERNs might represent the
activity of a single error detection system.
More recently, Holroyd and Coles (2002) argued that both
the response ERN and feedback ERN reﬂect the activity of a
reinforcement learning system that continually evaluates ongo-
ing events against expected outcomes. This reinforcement learn-
ing theory of the ERN is predicated on previous research
implicating the basal ganglia and the midbrain dopamine system
in reward prediction and reinforcement learning. According
to this previous research (Barto, 1995; Montague, Dayan, &
Sejnowski, 1996; for review, see Schultz, 2002), the basal ganglia
evaluate ongoing events and predict whether future events will be
favorable or unfavorable. When the basal ganglia revise their
predictions for the better or for the worse, they induce a phasic
increase or decrease, respectively, in the activity of midbrain do-
pamine neurons. These phasic increases and decreases in dopa-
mine activity indicate that ongoing events are ‘‘better than
expected’’ or ‘‘worse than expected,’’ respectively.
The reinforcement learning theory of the ERN extends this
theoretical framework by proposing that the impact of the
This research was supported in part by National Institutes of Mental
Health (NIMH) predoctoral fellowship MH069047 (G.H.), NIMH
postdoctoral fellowship MH63550 (C.B.H.), and NIMH grant
MH62196. Portions of this article were presented at the 44th annual
meeting of the Society for Psychophysiological Research, Santa Fe, New
Mexico, October, 2004.
Address reprint requests to: Greg Hajcak, Department of Psychology,
University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, USA. E-mail: hajcak@
psych.udel.edu.
Psychophysiology, 42 (2005), 161–170. Blackwell Publishing Inc. Printed in the USA.
Copyrightr 2005 Society for Psychophysiological Research
DOI: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2005.00278.x
161
dopamine signals on motor-related areas of the ACC modulates
the amplitude of the ERN, such that phasic decreases in dopa-
mine activity (indicating that ongoing events are worse than ex-
pected) are associated with large ERNs, and phasic increases in
dopamine activity (indicating that ongoing events are better than
expected) are associated with small ERNs (Holroyd & Coles,
2002; see also Holroyd, 2004). According to the theory, then, the
response ERN and the feedback ERN are both elicited by the
ﬁrst (unpredicted) indication that an unfavorable event is occur-
ring or is about to occur, the former by error responses and the
latter by undesired outcomes. The theory further holds that the
dopamine signals are used by themotor-related areas in the ACC
to improve performance on the task at hand according to prin-
ciples of reinforcement learning.
Although the reinforcement learning theory of the ERN pro-
poses that the ERN is associated with events that are worse than
expected, the theory is nonspecific about what actually consti-
tutes an ‘‘unfavorable’’ outcome. Thus, for example, the theory
does not distinguish between ﬁnancial rewards and punishments
on the one hand (as indicated by ‘‘utilitarian’’ feedback) and
correct trials and error trials on the other (as indicated by ‘‘per-
formance’’ feedback). Instead, the theory focuses on the rein-
forcing properties that these outcomes share in common
(Holroyd, Coles, & Nieuwenhuis, 2002). For example, in a re-
cent experiment Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, Schurger, and
Cohen (2004) found that when feedback stimuli conveyed both
utilitarian and performance information, the feedback ERN
could reﬂect either dimension of the information, depending on
which aspect of the feedback was emphasized. The authors ar-
gued that their ﬁndings indicated that ‘‘In the context of this
[reinforcement learning] theory, utilitarian and performance as-
pects of feedback are functionally equivalent: both evaluate out-
comes along a good–bad dimension, and hence both can elicit an
ERN’’ (p. 745, cf. Gehring & Willoughby, 2002).
Recently, we have begun to explore the conditions by which
external outcomes are categorized by the system as favorable or
unfavorable. In a recent experiment, for example, Holroyd, Lar-
sen, and Cohen (2004) found that the ERN was sensitive to the
relative value of feedback. In this experiment, feedback indicat-
ing that participants received nothing generated a large ERN in a
task context in which participants could win money, but that
same feedback did not generate an ERN in a task context in
which participants could losemoney. Thus, the ERNwas elicited
by unfavorable outcomes, where the favorableness of each out-
come was determined by the context in which the outcome was
delivered.
In the present study we tested a core prediction of the theory:
that the amplitude of the ERN is positively related to the size of
the outcome prediction error, and thus depends on the difference
between expected and actual outcomes. Evidence consistent with
this prediction was previously obtained in the original reinforce-
ment learning task adopted by Holroyd and Coles (2002; also see
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002) and in a subsequent guessing task
(Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2003). These studies
found that unexpected negative feedback produced the largest
ERNs. In the present study, we further tested this prediction by
manipulating participants’ expectancies on a trial-by-trial basis.
Specifically, participants performed a gambling experiment in
which they selected between four response options and were
presented with a feedback stimulus indicating that they either
received a reward (positive feedback) or received nothing (neg-
ative feedback); however, before making the response the par-
ticipants were presented with a cue indicating that they had either
a 25%, 50%, or 75% chance of receiving a ﬁnancial reward on
that trial. We predicted that the cues would induce expectancies
of future rewards, and that negative outcomes would elicit the
largest feedback ERNs on those trials in which rewards were
most expected.
To verify the success of this manipulation, we also measured
the amplitude of the P300, a component of the ERP that is sen-
sitive to expectancies (Courchesne, Hillyard, & Courchesne,
1977; Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Johnson & Donchin,
1980). We reasoned that if strong expectancies were induced in
the participants by the stimulus cues, then these expectancies
would be reﬂected in the amplitude of the P300. Furthermore,
based on a recent study by Yeung and Sanfey (2004), who found
equally large P300s following equiprobable negative and positive
feedback in a gambling experiment, we predicted that the P300
would not differ for positive and negative feedback.
EXPERIMENT 1
In this experiment, participants performed a guessing task similar
to that used byHolroyd et al. (2003): Participants were instructed
to guess which of four doors hid a prize; however, unlike the
Holroyd et al. study, at the start of each trial participants re-
ceived a cue indicating how many of the doors (1, 2, or 3) hid a
prize. Following each response, participants were presented with
feedback indicating whether or not their guess was accurate.
Consistent with the cue, the probability of negative feedback was
75%, 50%, and 25%, respectively, and thus the overall prob-
ability of negative feedback was 50%. We reasoned that partic-
ipants would tend to expect negative feedback on one-cue trials
and expect positive feedback on three-cue trials. If the ERN is
sensitive to expectations, as predicted by the reinforcement
learning theory of the ERN, then negative feedback on three-cue
trials should be associated with a larger ERN relative to negative
feedback on one-cue trials and the ERN to negative feedback on
two-cue trials should be intermediate. Additionally, we expected
the P300 to be larger for unexpected outcomes; based on the
recent results of Yeung and Sanfey (2004), we hypothesized that
P300 amplitude would not differ for positive versus negative
feedback.
Method
Participants
Eighteen undergraduate students (5 men) in an upper level psy-
chology class at the University of Delaware participated in the
current experiment for extra credit. Additionally, participants
were told that they could earn between $0.00 and $24.00 in bonus
money based on their performance. All participants were paid
$12.00. Data from 1 participant were not included due to a
technical malfunction.
Task
The task was administered on a Pentium I class computer, using
Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.) to con-
trol the presentation and timing of all stimuli. Throughout the
task, participants were shown a graphic representing four doors
in a horizontal line, andwere instructed to guess which door hid a
prize. Participants were instructed to press the left and right
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‘‘ctrl’’ and ‘‘alt’’ keys to select a door. Following each choice, a
feedback stimulus appeared on the screen that informed subjects
about the accuracy of their guess. A green ‘‘1’’ feedback indi-
cated a correct guess, and a green ‘‘o’’ feedback indicated an
incorrect guess. Prior to each trial, a white ‘‘1,’’ ‘‘2,’’ or ‘‘3’’ cue
appeared on the screen to inform the subjects how many doors
contained prizes. All stimuli were presented against a black
background, and were positioned in the center of the screen. All
cue and feedback stimuli occupied approximately 21 of visual
angle horizontally, and 21 vertically. A ﬁxation mark (1) was
presented just prior to the onset of each stimulus.
In terms of stimulus timing, the cue remained on the screen for
1000 ms; the doors appeared immediately following cue offset,
and remained on the screen until participants responded. Finally,
the feedback appeared 500 ms following response, and remained
on the screen for 1000 ms. The interval between offset of the
feedback stimulus and the following cue was 1000 ms.
Unbeknownst to the participants, the veracity of each trial
was predetermined and pseudorandom such that overall the
participants received exactly 50% correct feedback; negative
feedback was delivered on 25% of three-cue trials, 50% of two-
cue trials, and 75% of one-cue trials.
Procedure
After a brief description of the experiment, EEG sensors were
attached and the participant was given detailed task instructions.
To become familiar with the task, participants were given a
practice block consisting of 40 trials, andwere instructed to guess
which door hid a prize. Following the practice, participants were
told that they would earn $0.10 for each correct guess. The actual
experiment consisted of six blocks of 40 trials (240 total trials)
with each block initiated by the participant. The experimenter
entered the room every 80 trials to inform the participant how
muchmoney he or she had earned. Upon completion of the task,
participants were asked to ﬁll out a brief questionnaire.
Psychophysiological Recording, Data Reduction, and Analysis
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded using a Neuro-
soft Quik-Cap. Recordings were taken from three locations
along the midline: frontal (Fz), central (Cz), and parietal (Pz). In
addition, Med-Associates tin electrodes were placed on the left
and right mastoids (A1 and A2, respectively). During the re-
cording, all activity was referenced to Cz. The electrooculogram
(EOG) generated from blinks and vertical eye movements was
also recorded using Med-Associates miniature electrodes placed
approximately 1 cm above and below the participant’s right eye.
The right earlobe served as a ground site. All EEG/EOG elec-
trode impedances were below 10 KO and the data from all chan-
nels were recorded by a Grass Model 7D polygraph with Grass
Model 7P1F preampliﬁers (bandpass5 0.05–35 Hz).
All bioelectric signals were digitized on a laboratory micro-
computer using VPM software (Cook, 1999). The EEG was
sampled at 200 Hz. Data collection began with the participants’
response (500 ms prior to feedback) and continued for 1500 ms.
Off-line, the EEG for each trial was corrected for vertical EOG
artifacts using the method developed by Gratton, Coles, and
Donchin (1983; Miller, Gratton, & Yee, 1988) and then re-ref-
erenced to the average activity of the mastoid electrodes. Trials
were rejected and not counted in subsequent analysis if there was
excessive physiological artifact (i.e., 25 ms of invariant analog
data on any channel or A/D values on any channel that equaled
that converters minimum or maximum values). Single-trial EEG
data were lowpass ﬁltered at 20 Hz with a FIR digital ﬁlter as per
Cook and Miller (1992).
Finally, stimulus-locked ERPs were averaged based on ex-
pectancy and feedback valence. Specifically, averages were com-
puted for each of six feedback types: expected, neutral, and
unexpected negative feedback stimuli and expected, neutral, and
unexpected positive feedback stimuli.
The ERN was quantiﬁed at Fz, Cz, and Pz as follows. First,
each data point after feedback onset was subtracted from a
baseline equal to the average activity in a 200-mswindow prior to
the feedback. Next, a difference wave was created by subtracting
the ERP observed for positive feedback from the ERP observed
for negative feedback; this was done for expected outcomes
(negative feedback on a one-cue trial minus positive feedback on
a three-cue trial), neutral outcomes (negative feedback on a two-
cue trial minus positive feedback on a two-cue trial), and unex-
pected outcomes (negative feedback on a three-cue trial minus
positive feedback on a one-cue trial). ERNs for each level of
expectancy were then deﬁned as the maximum negative ampli-
tude of these difference waves within a window between 0.2 and
0.5 s following feedback. This procedure controlled for the main
effect of stimulus frequency on the ERP, ensuring that the ERP
measure was sensitive to the interaction of feedback frequency
and valence (Holroyd, 2004).
The P300 was also evaluated for each cue and outcome type at
Pz, where it was maximal. The P300 was deﬁned as the most
positive point in the ERP 200 to 600 ms following feedback
onset. The ERN and P300 were statistically evaluated using
SPSS (version 10.1) General Linear Model software with the
Greenhouse–Geisser correction applied to p values associated
with multiple df repeated-measures comparisons.
Results
Behavioral Results
The feedback was presented in a pseudorandom order such that
performance had no relationship to feedback. However, partic-
ipants were asked to complete a post-task questionnaire in which
they rated how much attention they paid to both the cue and the
feedback stimuli on a scale from 1 (the stimuli were ignored) to 7
(paid close attention). On average, participants rated their atten-
tion to cue and feedback stimuli as 5.69 (SD5 1.14) and 5.50
(SD5 1.32), respectively. These self-report data suggest that
participants were engaged in the task and paid attention to both
the cue and feedback stimuli (for similar self-report results, see
Holroyd, Larsen, et al., 2004). All participants reported that they
believed they performed better on the three-cue trials than on the
one-cue trials, suggesting that all participants were aware of the
reward contingencies and paid attention to both the cue and
feedback.
The Feedback ERN
Figure 1 presents stimulus-locked average ERPs for positive and
negative feedback for expected (left), neutral (middle), and un-
expected (right) outcomes at Fz (top), Cz (middle), and Pz (bot-
tom). Consistent with previous studies, negative feedback was
associated with a frontally maximal negative deﬂection that
peaked approximately 300 ms following feedback. Figure 2
presents the difference wave obtained by subtracting positive
from negative feedback for all levels of expectancy (expected
negative minus expected positive, neutral negative minus neutral
positive, and unexpected negative minus unexpected positive) at
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Fz (top), Cz (middle), and Pz (bottom), and Table 1 presents the
average ERN amplitudes. From both Figures 1 and 2, it is ap-
parent that the feedback ERNwas evident for negative feedback,
regardless of expectancy. A 3 (location)  3 (expectancy) re-
peated-measures ANOVA of the feedback ERN conﬁrmed the
impression from Figure 2 that the feedback ERN was largest at
frontal recording sites, F(2,32)5 17.41, po.001, e5 .83; how-
ever, the feedback ERN did not differ as a function of expect-
ancy, F(2,32)o1, and there was no interaction between location
and expectancy, F(4,64)o1. Consistent with the fronto-central
maximum reported in previous studies, post hoc tests indicated
that the ERN was larger at Fz and Cz than at Pz, t(17)5 6.19,
po.001 and t(17)5 5.02, po.001, respectively, but the ERNwas
equally large at Fz and Cz, t(17)5 1.21, p4.20.1
P300
Themean P300 amplitudes for expected, neutral, and unexpected
feedback at Pz are presented in Table 1. A 2 (feedback valence)
 3 (expectancy) repeated-measures ANOVA conﬁrmed that
P300 amplitude varied with respect to expectancy, F(2,32)5
45.48, po.001, e5 .82, but did not differ overall with respect to
the feedback valence, F(1,16)o1. Thus, the P300 was, in fact,
larger for more unexpected outcomes. Finally, the interaction
between feedback valence and expectancy, F(2,32)5 2.88,
p4.09, did not reach significance. Post hoc analyses conﬁrmed
that unexpected outcomes had larger P300s than both neutral,
t(17)5 5.94, po.001, and expected outcomes, t(17)5 8.71,
po.001; additionally, neutral outcomes had larger P300s than
expected outcomes, t(17)5 3.09, po.01.
Discussion
In the present study, the P300 was larger for unexpected out-
comes, and self-report data conﬁrmed that participants were
aware of the reward contingencies in the present study. Specif-
ically, all participants reported performing best on three-cue
(high reward probability) trials and worst on one-cue (low re-
ward probability) trials. Taken together, these data indicate that
the expectancy manipulation in the present study was success-
fulFand inﬂuenced both self-report and ERP data. In addition,
negative feedback in the present study was uniformly associated
with a negative deﬂection at the frontal recording site that peaked
approximately 300 ms after feedback onset. Because this nega-
tivity was virtually absent on trials with positive feedback, its
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Figure 1. ERPs for expected (left), neutral (middle), and unexpected (right) positive and negative feedback at Fz (top), Cz (middle),
and Pz (bottom) in Experiment 1. Feedback onset occurred at 0 ms.
1Even when the ERN was evaluated where it was maximal (Fz and
Cz), as in Holroyd et al. (2003), the effect of expectancy did not reach
significance (at both Fz and Cz: F [2,32]o1).
morphology, topography, and functional role are consistent with
previous reports on the feedback ERN. However, unexpected
feedback did not elicit larger magnitude ERNs, indicating that
the amplitude of the feedback ERN was insensitive to expecta-
tions regarding negative feedback.
The present study failed to ﬁnd an effect of expectations on
the amplitude of the feedback ERN when expectations were
manipulated on a trial-by-trial basis with a cue that indicated the
conditional probability of positive and negative feedback. These
results contrast with those reported byHolroyd et al. (2003), who
found a larger ERN for unexpected negative feedback, when
expectations were manipulated by the frequency of positive and
negative feedback. One possible explanation for the difference
between the present study and the Holroyd et al. study is the
method used to manipulate expectations of positive and negative
outcomes. Because Holroyd et al. (2003) found that infrequent
negative feedback was related to a larger ERN than frequent
negative feedback, we reasoned that a frequency manipulation
may engender stronger expectations regarding feedback. Ac-
cordingly, we further investigated the role of expectancy on the
ERN by manipulating expectations in a way similar to that used
by Holroyd et al. in Experiment 2 by varying the frequency of
negative feedback (25%, 50%, and 75%) between experimental
blocks.
EXPERIMENT 2
In this experiment, we induced expectancies of reward by ma-
nipulating the frequency of positive and negative feedback. On
each trial of the task, participants selected between four ‘‘bal-
loons’’ that appeared on a computer screen and were presented
with a feedback stimulus indicating that they either received a
reward or received nothing. Unbeknownst to the participants,
this feedback was delivered according to a random schedule that
varied by condition: Positive feedback was presented at random
on 25%, 50%, and 75% of the trials in each of three different
blocks. This design was similar to the Holroyd et al. (2003) ex-
periment but included a neutral (50%) condition in addition to
the high (75%) and low (25%) reward conditions to mirror the
levels of expectation from Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, we
predicted that the amplitude of the ERN would increase in pro-
portion to the probability of receiving positive feedback. We
predicted that the participants would develop expectancies of
future reward based on the frequency of reward delivered in each
condition, and that negative outcomes would elicit the largest
feedback ERNs in those conditions in which the rewards were
most frequent. Additionally, we expected that P300 amplitude
would be larger for more infrequent feedback.
Note that the critical difference between Experiments 1 and 2
is that, in the ﬁrst experiment, the expectancies were induced on a
trial-by-trial basis by the predictive cues, whereas in the second
Errors and expectations 165
Figure 2.Negative minus positive difference waves for expected, neutral,
and unexpected outcomes at Fz (top), Cz (middle), and Pz (bottom) from
Experiment 1. Feedback onset occurred at 0 ms.
Table 1. Mean (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for ERNMagnitudes at Fz, Cz, and Pz and P300Magnitudes at Pz in Studies 1 and 2
Study 1 Study 2
Expected Neutral Unexpected Frequent Neutral Infrequent
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
ERN
Fz  7.29 2.68  7.16 2.62  7.37 5.03  8.63 4.74  10.77 5.62  8.82 4.54
Cz  6.65 3.50  6.66 3.84  6.99 4.83  10.13 5.22  12.65 5.95  10.66 7.02
Pz  5.07 2.94  5.57 3.09  5.30 4.10  8.95 5.16  10.99 7.29  9.98 5.90
P300
Reward 16.53 5.40 17.50 5.81 19.11 5.97 18.13 6.42 21.83 7.86 21.88 7.07
Nonreward 15.45 4.64 16.25 5.16 19.91 5.79 12.38 3.97 16.27 5.80 17.17 5.34
experiment the expectancies were induced by exposure to se-
quences of positive and negative feedback throughout each block
of trials.
Method
Participants
Twelve undergraduate students (3 men) at Princeton University
participated for pay ($20.00) or class credit. In addition, all par-
ticipants earned a small monetary bonus (about $7.00), as de-
scribed below.
Task
Participants sat comfortably about 1.5 m in front of a computer
screen in an electromagnetically shielded room. On each trial of
the task, participants saw an imperative stimulus (0.61 high, 5.01
wide, blue color against a black background) consisting of four
circles in a row (‘‘O OOO’’). Participants were asked to imagine
that these circles were balloons, and were told that one of the
balloons contained 3 cents and the others were empty. The im-
perative stimulus remained on the screen until the participant
selected a balloon by pressing one of four buttons on a response
pad. At the time of the response, the imperative stimulus was
replaced by a second stimulus (0.61 high, 5.01 wide, blue color
against a black background, 1 s duration) in which the selected
balloonwas replaced by an asterisk (e.g., ‘‘nOOO’’ if the subject
selected the leftmost balloon). The purpose of the asterisk was to
indicate to the participant which balloon they had selected. Fol-
lowing the offset of the second stimulus, a feedback stimulus
appeared (0.61 high, red color, 1 s duration) directly above the
center of the previous stimulus. The interstimulus interval (ISI)
between the offset of the feedback stimulus and the onset of the
imperative stimulus was 0.5 s. The feedback stimuli were the
symbols ‘‘1’’ and ‘‘o.’’ Participants were told that presentation
of ‘‘1’’ (positive feedback) and ‘‘o’’ (negative feedback) stimuli
indicated that the balloon they chose on that trial contained 3
cents or 0 cents, respectively. Participants were told that they
should try to maximize the total amount of money earned, and
that they would receive that money at the end of the experiment.
Unbeknownst to the participants, the feedback was random.
Participants engaged in three blocks of 160 trials each; in each
block, positive feedback was delivered (at random, with replace-
ment) on either 25%, 50%, or 75% of the trials on that block.
The order of the blocks was systematically varied across partic-
ipants for counterbalancing.2 At the end of each block, partic-
ipants were informed the total amount of money they earned
during that block; across the experiment, participants earned a
total of about $7.00 in bonus money.
Data Acquisition
An electrode cap with Ag/AgCl electrodes was applied to each
participant. The EEG was recorded along the midline according
to the 10–20 system (Jasper, 1958) from channels FPz, AFz, Fz,
FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, POz, Oz, and Iz. Other electrodes were placed
on the right mastoid, above and below the right eye, and on the
outer canthi of both eyes. The ground electrodewas placed on the
chin or on the cheek. All electrode recordings were referenced to
an electrode placed on the left mastoid. EEG data were recorded
with Sensorium Inc. (Charlotte, VT) EPA-6 128-Channel Elect-
rophysiology Ampliﬁers at a sample rate of 250 Hz. Impedances
were less than 40 KO. Experimental control and data acquisition
were controlled by E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.,
Pittsburgh, PA) and Cogniscan (Newfoundland, NJ), respec-
tively. Participants answered a short questionnaire upon com-
pletion of the experiment.
Data Analysis
For each feedback stimulus, a 1-s epoch of data (200 ms baseline)
was extracted from the continuous data ﬁle for analysis. Ocular
artifact was corrected with an eye-movement correction algo-
rithm (Gratton et al., 1983). The EEG data were re-referenced
off-line to average mastoid electrodes by subtracting, from each
sample of data recorded at each channel, one-half of the activity
recorded from the right mastoid. The re-referenced data were
then baseline corrected by subtracting, from each sample of data
recorded at each channel, the average activity of that channel
during the baseline period. Single-trial EEG data were lowpass
ﬁltered below 20 Hz with the Interactive Data Language (Re-
search Systems, Inc., Boulder, CO) digital ﬁlter algorithm. ERPs
were created for each participant by averaging the single-trial
EEG according to feedback type and condition.
The ERN was evaluated in the same manner as described in
Experiment 1 at Fz, Cz, and Pz as the peak of the difference
waves for all levels of feedback frequency (frequent negative mi-
nus frequent positive, neutral negative minus neutral positive,
and infrequent negative minus infrequent positive). The P300
amplitude was quantiﬁed at channel Pz, where it was maximal,
andwas evaluated in the samemanner described in Experiment 1.
The data were submitted toANOVAwith repeatedmeasures.
The Greenhouse–Geisser correction for repeated measure was
applied where appropriate.
Results
Behavior
Because the feedback in this experiment was delivered randomly,
the experiment did not provide ameaningful behavioral measure.
However, upon completion of the experiment, participants were
asked to evaluate their interest in the task. On a scale from 1 (the
feedback stimuli were generally ignored) to 5 (the feedback stimuli
were evaluated closely; participants were interested whether or not
they won or lost money on each trial), participants rated their
interest in the feedback as 4.3  0.7, suggesting that they at-
tended to the task. In addition, debriefing revealed that many
subjects believed that they exercised some degree of control over
the feedback, suggesting that they tried to use the feedback to
guide their behavior (cf. Holroyd et al., 2004).
The feedback ERN
Figure 3 presents the ERPs for positive and negative feedback for
the frequent (left), neutral (middle), and infrequent (right) out-
comes at Fz (top), Cz (middle), and Pz (bottom). The feedback
ERN is characterized by the negative deﬂection that peaked
about 300 ms following negative feedback. Figure 4 presents the
negative feedback minus positive feedback difference waves for
all levels of frequency at Fz (top), Cz (middle), and Pz (bottom)
and Table 1 presents the average ERN amplitudes. Inspection of
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2As a control (see Holroyd, 2004), participants also engaged in an
‘‘oddball’’ task in which they counted the occurrence of a target stimulus
that appeared on 10% of the trials (stimuli: ‘‘1’’ and ‘‘o,’’ 1 s duration,
target type counterbalanced within subject; intertrial stimulus inter-
val5 0.5 s). The oddball task consisted of two blocks of 200 trials each.
The order of tasks was counterbalanced across participants, such that
half of the participants performed the oddball task before the reward
expectancy task.
Figures 3 and 4 suggest that the ERPs associated with positive
and negative feedback were about equally different from one
another irrespective of frequency. A 3 (electrode site)  3 (fre-
quency) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of
electrode site,F(2,22)5 4.17, po0.05, e5 .79, but nomain effect
of frequency, F(2,22)o1, nor an Frequency  Electrode inter-
action, F(4,44)o1.3 Consistent with a fronto-central maximum,
post hoc tests indicated that the ERN was larger at Cz than both
Fz and Pz, t(11)5 2.98, po.05 and t(11)5 2.43, po.05, respec-
tively, and that the ERNdid not differ at the Fz and Pz recording
sites, t(11)o1.4
P300
The mean P300 amplitudes for frequent, neutral, and infrequent
feedback are presented in Table 1. Inspection of these data and
ERP waveforms in Figure 3 suggests that, consistent with pre-
vious results, P300 amplitude was larger for infrequent outcomes
than for frequent outcomes (Donchin & Coles, 1988). This ob-
servation was conﬁrmed by a two-way repeated-measures ANO-
VA on feedback valence (positive, negative) and frequency
(frequent, neutral, infrequent), which indicated that P300 am-
plitude varied with respect to frequency, F(2,22)5 9.46, po.005,
e5 .84. Post hoc paired-sample t tests indicated that both neutral
and infrequent outcomes generated larger P300s than frequent
outcomes, t(11)5 3.61, po.01 and t(11)5 4.91, po.001, re-
spectively; P300s did not differ for neutral compared to infre-
quent outcomes, t(11)o1. Furthermore, a main effect of valence
indicated that P300 was larger to positive feedback than to neg-
ative feedback, F(1,11)5 22.11, po.001, e5 1.00. In contrast,
there was no interaction of valence and frequency, F(2,22)o1.0.
Discussion
In contrast to a previous report that found an enhanced ERN for
infrequent negative outcomes (Holroyd et al., 2003), these results
failed to show evidence that the ERN amplitude is sensitive to
expectancy. That is, processing associated with feedback valence
(as measured by the maximal difference between ERPs associ-
ated with positive and negative feedback) was not modulated by
frequency of occurrence. In contrast, P300 amplitude revealed
main effects of both valence and expectancy, but no interaction.
These results are discussed further below.
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Figure 3. ERPs for frequent (left), neutral (middle), and infrequent (right) positive and negative feedback at Fz (top), Cz (middle),
and Pz (bottom) in Experiment 2. Feedback onset occurred at 0 ms.
3It is possible that these effects were not significant because the par-
ticipants only developed frequency-based expectations toward the end of
each block. To address this possibility, we analyzed ERNs from the sec-
ond half of each block; this analysis indicated nomain effect of frequency,
F(2,22)o1, nor a Frequency  Electrode interaction, F(4,44)o1.
4We also evaluated the ERN where it was maximal (Cz), as in Hol-
royd et al. (2003); the effect of expectancy did not reach significance,
F(2,22)o1.
General Discussion
The effect of expectancy on feedback processing was evaluated in
two experiments. First, expectancies were induced trial by trial by
cues that indicated the probability of positive feedback on each
trial. Second, the expectancies were induced by varying the fre-
quency of occurrence of positive feedback across blocks of trials.
In both experiments, the P300 amplitude was largest for the un-
expected outcomes, conﬁrming that participants indeed formed
expectations regarding feedback. Contrary to our prediction,
however, the results of both experiments indicated that the am-
plitude of the feedback ERN was insensitive to expectancy.
It is important to note that there were several differences be-
tween the results of Experiments 1 and 2. Although the scalp
topography of the ERN in both Experiments 1 and 2 are con-
sistent with previous studies that report a fronto-central maxi-
mum, the difference wave was clearly fronto-centrally maximal
in Experiment 1, but was centrally maximal in Experiment 2.
These results may have been due to sequence and timing differ-
ences between the experiments. Specifically, in Experiment 1 a
500-ms delay occurred between response and feedback, whereas
in Experiment 2 an intervening stimulus occurred for 1 s between
the response and feedback. These differences may have contrib-
uted to the topographical differences in the scalp distribution of
the ERN between the experiments. However, despite large dif-
ferences in the implementation of the two experimentsFinclud-
ing the location where the experiments were carried out, the
equipment used to conduct the experiments, and the task it-
selfFthe two experiments converged on the same essential result:
Unexpected negative feedback was not associated with an en-
hanced ERN. This convergence provides an indication of the
robustness of these results.
These results contrast with ﬁndings from previous investiga-
tions from trial-and-error learning experiments that demonstrate
an enhanced ERN for unexpected negative feedback (Holroyd &
Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002). In these studies, subjects
learned stimulus–response mappings based on feedback; how-
ever, subjects occasionally received negative feedback that was
inconsistent with the learned stimulus–response mapping, and
this type of unexpected negative feedback generated an enhanced
ERN. Our ﬁndings can be reconciled with these observations if
one assumes that the sensitivity of the system that generates the
ERN to expectations is highly nonlinear, such that only extreme
violations of expectancy (between 75% and 100%) exercise the
amplitude of the ERN.
Although both trial-and-error learning tasks and gambling
tasks involve feedback that indicates positive and negative out-
comes, these tasks appear to differ insofar as subjects cannot
learn systematically in gambling tasks because feedback is deliv-
ered randomly. Nevertheless, from an operant perspective, even
a gambling task is a trial-and-error learning task as participants
do not know a priori that feedback is not useful. In fact, many
participants reported both using the feedback to inform their
decisions and ﬁnding patterns in the feedback.
The present studies also contrast with the results of Holroyd
et al. (2003), who found that infrequent negative feedback in a
gambling task elicited a larger ERN than frequent negative
feedback. Importantly, theHolroyd et al. study was analogous to
the present Experiment 2, but without the neutral (50%) con-
dition. Again, it is possible that the feedback ERN is most sen-
sitive to probabilities greater than 75%. Although the feedback
ERN would also be sensitive to intermediate probabilities, dif-
ferences in feedback ERN amplitude would be more difﬁcult to
discriminate. If such were the case, then the results of the Ho-
lroyd et al. experiment might be due to a statistical anomaly.
Somewhat surprisingly, we note that in Experiment 2 P300
amplitude was larger to positive feedback than to negative feed-
back, irrespective of feedback expectancy (Figure 3, bottom). A
similar result was found in the study by Holroyd et al. (2004; see
their Figures 3a, 3b), although the ﬁnding was not discussed in
that paper. Taken together, these results suggest that P300 am-
plitude is larger for positive outcomes than for negative outcomes
(cf. Johnson & Donchin, 1985). These results contrast with re-
cent research suggesting that the P300 is insensitive to feedback
valence (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004) and with the results of our Ex-
periment 1 in which a main effect of valence on P300 amplitude
was not observed. Likewise, these results appear to contradict a
proposal by Ito, Larsen, Smith, and Cacioppo (1998; Ito & Ca-
cioppo, 2000) that unfavorable events elicit larger P300s than
favorable events because of a ‘‘negativity bias’’ (however, see
Johnson &Donchin, 1985, who report larger P300 amplitudes to
positive feedback).
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Figure 4. Negative minus positive difference waves for frequent, neutral,
and infrequent outcomes at Fz (top), Cz (middle), and Pz (bottom) from
Experiment 2. Feedback onset occurred at 0 ms.
These differing results on the P300 may have to do with sub-
jective expectations regarding the frequency of positive and neg-
ative feedback. For instance, subjects may believe that positive
feedback is more likely overall than negative feedbackFeven
when the objective frequency of feedback is equal (e.g., in Ex-
periment 1). If this were the case, the P300 to negative feedback
may be enhanced because it is perceived as more infrequent. That
is, an enhanced P300 to positive feedbackmay be obscured by the
effects of expectations on the P300, if negative feedback is per-
ceived as relatively infrequent.
Given that the feedback ERN was deﬁned in this experiment
as themaximumamplitude of the differencewave associatedwith
positive and negative feedback, it might be asked whether or not
our measure was sensitive to component overlap with the P300
rather than to the feedback ERN itself. In this regard we can
make several observations. First, the size of the difference was
largest at frontal (Experiment 1) and central (Experiment 2) scalp
locations, suggesting that the variation in the component’s am-
plitude was due to something other than P300, which is largest
over parietal cortex (Donchin & Coles, 1988). Second, the re-
inforcement learning theory of the ERN is nonspecific about
whether or not unpredicted positive events induce a positive-
going deﬂection of the ERP (Holroyd, 2004). For this reason it is
important to evaluate ERPs associated with both positive and
negative feedback when testing the theory. Third, the difference
measure is an appropriatemethod to isolate the effects of valence
on the ERP from other effects that are purely frequency related.
For instance, it is apparent in both Figures 1 and 3 that positive
feedback on unexpected trials was also characterized by a slightly
enhanced negativity in the time range of the ERN (cf. Holroyd,
2004). Accordingly, the difference wave measure is sensitive to
variance in the activation of the cognitive process of interest
(valence processing), rather than to particular deﬂections in the
ERP that may or may not be correlated with that process.
In conclusion, this study does not provide support for the
reinforcement learning theory of the ERN, which predicts that
variation in the amplitude of the feedback ERN should be larger
for unpredicted outcomes than for predicted outcomes. It is un-
clear why these results contrast with prior ﬁndings, particularly
with those of the study byHolroyd et al. (2003). It is possible that
the probabilities in the present study were not extreme enough to
exercise the amplitude of the ERN, despite the observed sensi-
tivity of the P300 to those probabilities. On the other hand, it
must be admitted that the present range of probabilities (25%–
75%) seems rather large; if the system that produces the ERN is
mainly sensitive to more extreme probabilities, then it must be
highly nonlinear. A future study could examine this question by
using probabilities that induce even stronger expectations.
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